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PRIVACY AND THE PRESS SINCE
TIME, INC. V. HILL
Don R. Pember* and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr.**
To say that the law of privacy is not a great hallmark of logic and
clarity in American law is to indulge in egregious understatement.
This area of law continues, to borrow James Thurber's phrase, to be
as "disorderly as a whore's top drawer."' Fascination with the spas-
modic growth of the invasion of privacy tort is evidenced by scores of
books.2 Part of this abundant interest is perhaps due to privacy law's
relative youth; it is less than 100 years old. Also, scholars may have
had their interest piqued because it is one of the few areas of law
whose striking growth in this century has stemmed largely from
common law creation rather than from legislation or statutory inter-
pretation.
At this writing, a right of privacy is recognized in 39 states,
as well as in the District of Columbia.3 Most of this recognition is
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1964, M.A., 1966, Michigan State University; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1969.
** Professor, Department of Journalism, and Director of Graduate Studies, School
of Communications, University of Kentucky; A.B., 1956, MJ., 1959, University of
California (Berkeley); Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1966.
1. WRITERS AT WORK: THE PARIS REVIEW INTERVIEWS 86 (M. Cowley ed. 1959).
2. See, e.g., M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); S. HOFSTADTER &
G. HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY (1971); V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); D. PEMBER, PRIVACY
AND THE PRESS (1972); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
3. As of 1960, a common law right of privacy was recognized in the District of
Columbia and 26 states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
386-87 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. (Readers unfamiliar with the law of
privacy are advised to read Prosser's article in full for an excellent overview.) Since
Prosser's survey, the courts of nine more states have adopted the majority view: Olan
Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d
753, 755 (Colo. 1970); Barbieri v. News-Journal Publishing Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del.
1963); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Haw. 374,441 P.2d 141 (1968);
Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841(1962); Hambergerv. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239
(N.H.1964); Apodaca v. Miller, 441 P.2d 200, 204 (N.M. 1968); Truxes v. Kenco Enter-
prises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d
858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
The courts of three states have specifically refused to recognize a right of privacy:
Brunson v. Ranks Army Stores, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Henry v.
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judicial; there were only five states with privacy statutes at the end
of 1973. 4 It should be noted, however, that in New York alone, a
great number of privacy actions have been initiated under that state's
privacy statute, partly because of the statute's 70-year history, but
more importantly because New York City is a leading publishing center
and the press is a party to the lion's share of privacy lawsuits. 5
Uncertainty has always been an underlying, if not dominating cur-
rent in the development of privacy law.6 One of the causes of this
uncertainty is the amorphous nature of the legal concept, "right of
privacy." Although few quarrel with the desirability of a right of
privacy, there is noticeable and continuing disagreement over what
that right should entail.7
In addition, the right of privacy conflicts with many fundamental
precepts of our legal, political and economic systems. The requisite
openness of a democratic society seems to be the antithesis of a right
to be let alone; the most timid or reclusive soul may be stripped of his
privacy if he unwittingly becomes enmeshed in a newsworthy event. 8
Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909): Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430.
75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
The courts and legislatures of seven states have not yet explicitly accepted or
rejected a right of privacy: Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts (but see Commonwealth v.
Wiseman. 356 Mass. 251. 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969). cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970)).
Minnesota, North Dakota, Washington. Wyoming. The existence of such a right is
also uncertain in Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. § 5601(6) (Supp. 1972), lists
"invasion of the right to privacy" among those torts for which the state may not be
found liable: however, no state court decision nor any other statute can be found to
suggest a general recognition of the right.
Five remaining states have defined a right of privacy by statute. See note 4 infra.
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1974): N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (Supp. 1973): UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-4-8_9 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1957).
5. D. PEMBER. PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 231 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy"? 4 S.D.L. REV. 1
(1959).
7. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Kalven], Nimmer. The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203
(1954): Prosser, supra note 3; Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND.
L. REV. 1093 (1962): Wright. Defamation, Privacy and the Public's Right to Know:
A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Wright].
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227. 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)
(woman spotlighted in news when husband murdered as they walked together):
Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (innocent
bystander in film of televised police raid). Compare Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.. 113
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (former child prodigy again placed in limelight by magazine
article after 20 years of anonymity). See also text accompanying notes 33-47 infra.
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Recent public disclosure laws have prompted numerous public offi-
cials to resign their posts rather than comply with rigid disclosure re-
quirements which, the officials contend, constitute an invasion of their
privacy.9
The right of privacy quite obviously collides head-on with freedom
of the press.10 While revelations of the news media are sometimes in-
accurate or tasteless, and often appeal to the readers' baser emotions,
such revelations are traditionally protected unless defamatory, sedi-
tious or obscene." Most thoughtful individuals agree that such protec-
tion of the press is necessary, even though grievous and unrequited
harm may be visited upon individuals' reputations or feelings. 12 When
judges have been presented with the opportunity to decide that a sub-
ject was not newsworthy, they have generally declined to do so.13 This
reluctance is due in large part to the recognition that "[e] xposure of
the self to others ... is an essential incident of life in a society which
places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.' 4 Most
judges who have addressed this privacy issue believe that they, like
newsmen, should not be placed in the role of editors, deciding what
the public should or should not read, see or hear. 15
9. For example, the Washington Public Disclosure Law, adopted as a citizen
initiative (Initiative Measure 276, ch. 1, [1973] Wash. Laws, codified in WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 42.17 (Supp. 1973)), places a heavy burden of disclosure on elected
officials. The Washington State Public Disclosure Commission recently compiled a
list of 7,022 public officials in Washington subject to the requirements of the Public
Disclosure Act. Of that number, 180 informed the Commission that they were either
resigning or allowing their term of office to expire without seeking reelection, so that
they would not need to comply with the Act. An additional 2,500 were found to be
in noncompliance during 1974. Of the latter group, 159 had failed to respond to
either of two Commission mailings as of October 9, 1974. Interview with Cindy Fey,
Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Olympia, Oct. 9, 1974.
The Washington Public Ports Association estimates that, as of October 18, 1974,
30 of its members have resigned their offices or declined to run for reelection
rather than comply with the Act's disclosure requirements. Interview with Don
White, Washington Public Ports Association, Olympia, Oct. 18, 1974. Similarly, the
Washington State School Directors Association estimates that, as of January 31,
1974, 235 of its members had resigned or failed to seek reelection because of the
Act's requirements. Interview with Judy McDaniel, Washington State School Directors
Association, Olympia, Oct. 23, 1974.
10. Prosser, supra note 3, at 401.
11. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
12. See Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibi-
tions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107 (1963); Wright, supra note 7.
13. See notes 106-10 and accompanying text infra.
14. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
15. Pember, Privacy and the Press: The Defense of Newsworthiness, 45
JOURNALISM QARTERLY 14 (1968).
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Finally, the American people have yielded much of their personal
privacy in return for access to a market place founded upon consumer
credit. Most persons in this nation are willing to reveal to a credit
manager information about themselves or their neighbors that they
would not disclose to their priest or doctor. And what people will not
disclose, American enterprise has found ways to discover.6
In this article, the authors do not propose to discuss the innumer-
able ways in which one's privacy is invaded or to survey the entire
sweep of the law of privacy, but rather attempt to trace briefly its de-
velopment, with particular emphasis on how the law has affected the
mass media since the Supreme Court decided its first privacy case,
Time, Inc. v. Hill,' 7 in 1967. In so doing, we hope to add somewhat
to the understanding of this unsettled area of law.' 8
1. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT BEFORE TIME, INC. V. HILL
A legal right of privacy was first proposed roughly 85 years ago by
a socially prominent Boston attorney, Samuel D. Warren. History
records that Warren, incensed by the press coverage of his family's
social affairs, enlisted the aid of his former law partner, Louis D.
Brandeis, to write an article calling for courts to protect the right to
be let alone.' 9 Published in 1890,20 the Warren-Brandeis essay, "The
Right to Privacy," has been acclaimed as the most influential law re-
view article in American history.2 t However, the impact of the article
was not immediate; a right of privacy was not legislatively recognized
until the New York legislature enacted America's first privacy statute
in 1903.22 Moreover, three quarters of a century later, legal scholars
continue to harbor doubts as to the legitimacy of the doctrine as a tort
remedy. Professor Harry Kalven recently wrote:2 3
16. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 67-89 (197 1).
17. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
18. The authors have attempted to be objective in preparing this article. The
reader is cautioned, however, that, inasmuch as both authors devote much of their
professional energy to the study of the mass media, some unintended bias in favor
of that industry may surface from time to time.
19. Prosser. supra note 3, at 383-84. See also note 67 infra.
20. Warren & Brandeis. The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Ch. 132. §§ 1, 2 [1903] N.Y. Laws. codified as amended in N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). Some lower courts gave tacit recognition to the principle
during the 1890's. See Prosser, supra note 3. at 385 nn.8-10.
23. Kalven, supra note 7. at 337.
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The lack of a legal profile and the enormity of the counter-privilege
converge to raise for me the question of whether privacy is really a
viable tort remedy. The mountain, I suggest, has brought forth a pretty
small mouse.
Despite lingering doubts concerning its validity, privacy law has
continued to develop. It has evolved to encompass not just a single
individual interest, but at least four. One area of privacy law, akin to
the law of trespass, protects against intrusions of the solitude of an
individual-against wiretapping, bugging and the like.24 The second
and only truly unique area of the law of privacy involves the prohibi-
tion against publication of private information about an individual;
this area has received least support from the courts. 25 The third area,
similar to the law of defamation,26 involves the prohibition against
publication of nondefamatory falsehoods, i.e., material which places
an individual in what some legal scholars call a "false light.127 The
fourth area of privacy law protects an individual's property rights to
his own name or likeness, much like the law of literary property pro-
tects an individual's creative works. This area of privacy law was first
recognized as a means to halt the unauthorized use of an individual's
name or picture for advertising or trade purposes.28
Thus, the late Dean Prosser suggested that there are really four
torts, not just one, within the law of privacy:29
1) Intrusion upon an individual's physical solitude;
2) Publication of private information about an individual;
24. See discussion in Part III infra. This concept was eloquently embraced by
dissenting Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927), a
case involving government wiretapping:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditiofis favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. . . .They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable in-
trusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the [Constitution].
25. See, e.g., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434 (C.C.D. Mass, 1893), rev'd on
rehearing, 64 F. 280 (1894); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940);
Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956); Hubbard v. Journal
Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
26. Unlike the law of defamation, the law of privacy does not make truth available
as a defense, except in those cases involving individuals placed in a false perspective
in the public eye. Prosser, supra note 3, at 398-401.
27. See discussion in Part V infra.
28. See discussion in Part VI infra.
29. Prosser, supra note 3, at 389.
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3) Placement of an individual in a false light in the public eye; and
4) Appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commer-
cial gain. This formulation has received widespread judicial approv-
al, 30 and is undoubtedly the most complete and concise enunciation
of the principles of privacy law. However, Prosser's categories are
not mutually exclusive; it is possible to conceive of fact situations
simultaneously involving two or more of his categories.3 1
Prosser's attempt to create order, although not a complete success,
is better appreciated after one surveys the jurisprudential potpourri
created by the state and federal courts. The decisions are confusing
and frustrating because the courts arrive at differing conclusions when
asked to balance societal and individual interests in privacy actions,
absent adequate definition of what those interests entail. 32
A new ingredient was added to the stew when, in Time, Inc. v.
Hill,"(3 the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment protects
publishers who have been sued for invasion of privacy. Borrowing a
broad defense established in a series of libel cases beginning in 1964
with New York Times v. Sullivan,34 the Court ruled that in certain
kinds of privacy suits, plaintiffs must prove malice-and a very spe-
cial kind of malice, as discussed in the next section-to sustain a
cause of action. Although this new ingredient has not unduly confused
the law of privacy, neither has it provided meaningful clarification.
Nor has it revolutionized the law of privacy as the New York Times
malice rule revolutionized the law of libel.35
II. THE IMPACT OF TIME, INC. V. HILL
It was the publication of nondefamatory falsehoods about the
James J. Hill family in 1955 that ultimately led to the 1967 Supreme
30. See, e.g., Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963).
31. For example, a magazine writer might have used a hidden camera to take
secret pictures of the plaintiff, and then published them. In such a case, an action
might be maintained under both intrusion and private information. Or a film critic's
name might be used as a testimonial for a movie which the critic really disliked. An
action based on the advertisement could conceivably be based on both appropriation
and false light.
32. Compare, e.g., Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App. 285. 297 P. 91 (1931). with Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
33. 385 U.S. 374(1967).
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer. 383 U.S. 75 (1966): Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
35. See Kalven. The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
Vol. 50: 57, 1974
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Court decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill. The Hill family was living com-
fortably in suburban Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, in September of
1952 when their anonymity was shattered by three escaped convicts.
The escapees held the Hills and their five children hostage in their
own home for 19 hours. During this siege the Hills became the subject
of national news attention which intensified when two of the three
convicts were killed a few days later in a shoot-out with police.36
In 1953, Random House published Joseph Hayes' novel, The Des-
perate Hours, about a family named "Hilliard" which had been terror-
ized in its home by escaped convicts. Hayes later transformed his
novel into a successful stage play. In 1955, while the Broadway com-
pany of "The Desperate Hours" was rehearsing in Philadelphia, Life
magazine arranged for actors to visit the Hill's former home in nearby
Whitemarsh. Life posed actors in the house in a number of scenes
from the play, and published a story entitled "True Crime Inspires
Tense Play." Life declared that the play depicted actual events in the
life of the Hill family. The story was illustrated with actor-posed pho-
tographs, including one representing a son being "roughed up" by one
of the convicts and another, entitled "daring daughter," showing the
daughter biting a convict's hand in an effort to make him drop his
gun. Neither Hayes' novel nor his play completely substantiated Life's
contention that Hayes' writings were based upon the Hill family's or-
deal: Hayes had used a family named Hilliard, not Hill; additionally,
the Hills had not actually been harmed by the convicts. Both novel
and play did, however, have episodes in which the father and a son
were beaten and the daughter "subjected to a verbal sexual insult. '37
Suing for invasion of privacy, Hill sought damages under the pri-
vacy provisions of New York's Civil Rights Law, which permit re-
covery if an individual's name or likeness is used for "advertising pur-
poses, or for the purposes of trade" without first obtaining permis-
sion.38 Hill argued that the Life article gave the impression that
the play mirrored the Hill family's captivity, "which, to the knowl-
edge of the defendant . . . 'was false and untrue.' -39 In its defense,
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
36. 385U.S. at 377-78.
37. Id.
38. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948).
39. 385 U.S. at 378.
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Time, Inc. (Life's parent corporation) argued that the article was
newsworthy, of public interest, and "published in good faith without
any malice whatsoever .... "40
The New York trial court awarded damages to the Hills, and both
the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of New York af-
firmed. 41 However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was
reversed. The Court paid careful attention to the constitutional issues
of freedom of the press raised by defendant Time, Inc. It recognized
as a threshold proposition that truth would be a complete defense to a
lawsuit for invasion of privacy when allegations of nondefamatory
falsehood were made.412
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan then grappled with the more
immediate issues involving falsehood or fictionalization. James Hill,
he wrote, had become newsworthy and had substantially lost his right
to privacy "insofar as his hostage experience was involved. '43 Hill,
however, could maintain a cause of action if Life had either "ex-
ploited for . . . commercial benefit," or "fictionalized." 44 Justice
Brennan, guided by his own majority opinion in New York Times v.
Sullivan,45 wrote: 46
Material and substantial falsification is the test. . . .Factual error,
content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient for
an award of damages for false statements unless actual malice-
knowledge that the statements are false or in reckless disregard of the
truth-is alleged and proved ...
The Court then specifically held:4 7
[T] he constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the
application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters
of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published
the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth.
40. Id. at 378 79.
41. 18App. Div. 2d485. 240N.Y.S.2d 286 1963).affd 15N.Y.2d986.207 N.E.2d
604. 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
42. 385 U.S. at 383-84.
43. Id. at 386.
44. Id.
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. 385 U.S. at 386 87.
47. Id. at 387-88.
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After Time, Inc. v. Hill was decided, it remained unclear how far
this first amendment protection would be extended into the law of
privacy.48 Four years later in the libel case of Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc.,49 Justice Brennan explained that after Time, Inc. v. Hill,
the New York Times malice rule should be applied only in "suits for
invasion of privacy based on false statements where ... a matter of
public interest was involved."50 This view understates the impact
Time, Inc. v. Hill has had upon privacy law. The decision has touched
a wide variety of cases, including cases involving false statements and
those involving true statements. It is safe to say that Time, Inc. v. Hill
has sensitized judges throughout the country to the first amendment
implications of privacy actions which involve the news media.5 1 We
now turn to the specific effects of Time, Inc. v. Hill upon the tort sub-
categories described earlier.5 2
III. THE INTRUDING NEWSMAN
Intrusion, the first of the four torts in privacy law as described by
Dean Prosser, 53 is quite different from the other three. The tort of
intrusion occurs when a person's privacy is encroached upon by the
methods used to gather information about that person. The other three
privacy torts listed by Prosser-publication of private facts, putting
someone in a false light, and appropriation of a person's name or
likeness-all involve what is done with the information or material
once it has been gathered. Some kind of publication is required for a
cause of action in the latter three areas of privacy. In the intrusion
area, however, a cause of action lies merely if the plaintiffs solitude
or zone of privacy is penetrated. In New Hampshire, for example, a
landlord bugged the bedroom of his newlywed tenants, evidently for
48. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Justice Brennan carefully
explained that the Court was applying the Sullivan principles only "in this discrete
context," and did not intend thereby to merge privacy law into the law of libel.
385 U.S. at 390-91.
49. 403 U.S. 29 (197 1).
50. Id.at3ln.l.
51. See, e.g., Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D. S.C. 1969);
Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
52. See text following note 29 supra.
53. Id.
Washington Law Review
the enjoyment of hearing the sounds of marital bliss. The products of
this surveillance were never published, yet the intrusion had taken
place and a cause of action was recognized. 54
The press has rarely been involved in lawsuits in the intrusion
area.55 This paucity of cases is caused by several factors. First,
the press has generally conducted its information-gathering without the
use of surreptitious devices. It has been only recently that a few news-
men have become as comfortable with hidden cameras and microphones
as with pencil and paper. Second, persons whose privacy is secretly
violated rarely know it. Third, even if they are aware that someone
has been snooping, the evidence needed to support a law suit is usually
difficult to produce. Finally, a party ordinarily learns that a news-
man has penetrated the so-called zone of privacy only after the infor-
mation acquired is disseminated by use of mass media. In those cases,
it is normally easier for the aggrieved party to maintain an action
based on the publication of the material than to pursue legal redress
for the intrusion itself.
The case law since Time, Inc. v. Hill has consistently recognized
the distinction between surreptitious information-gathering as one
form of invasion of privacy and the publication of that information as
another. In 1968, the Liberty Lobby sued the late columnist Drew
Pearson for his publication of some of the organization's secret docu-
ments. 56 These papers had been clandestinely copied by a Liberty
Lobby employee and then given to the Pearson. The lawsuit foun-
dered, however, when the plaintiffs were unable to produce any evi-
dence to show that Pearson was involved with the copying or removal
of the private papers from the Liberty Lobby offices.
A year later, Pearson was sued again-as was Pearson's associate,
Jack Anderson-this time by former Senator Thomas Dodd of Con-
necticut. In Pearson v. Dodd,57 the Senator complained that docu-
ments from his files had been secretly copied by his own employees
and given to the Washington writers. The Pearson-Anderson "Wash-
54. Hamberger v. Eastman. 106 N.H. 107. 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
55. There were only a handful of press-connected intrusion cases on record prior
to Time, Inc. v. Hill. See Peed v. Washington Times Co.. 55 WASH. LAw REP. 182
(D.C. Sup. Ct. 1927): Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner. 35 Cal. App. 2d 304. 95
P.2d 491 (1939).
56. Liberty Lobby. Inc. v. Pearson. 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
57. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ington Merry-Go-Round" column proceeded to run six stories based
on the Senator's files, damaging Dodd with information which sug-
gested appropriation of campaign funds for personal purposes and
consociation with lobbyists for foreign interests. 58 Dodd contended
that the manner in which the material was obtained invaded his pri-
vacy.59
Writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge J. Skelly Wright stated that the restrictions on collectors of in-
formation do not necessarily bind disseminators of that information.
He noted that unlike other areas of privacy law, intrusion does not
require publication as one of its essential elements; because the intru-
sion and publication in Pearson v. Dodd were separate acts, com-
mitted by different individuals, the publisher should not be held re-
sponsible for the acts of the intruders. Judge Wright declared: 60
If we were to hold appellants liable for invasion of privacy on these
facts, we would establish the proposition that one who receives infor-
mation from an intruder, knowing it has been obtained by improper
intrusion, is guilty of a tort. In an untried and developing area of tort
law, we are not prepared to go so far.
Insofar as it separates intrusion from publication, Judge Wright's
statement is a fair reading of the past and current status of privacy
law. Thus, only when directing or participating in the intrusion itself
need the press fear an intrusion action.
The press was held liable for intrusion, however, in a fascinating
1971 case. In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,61 two Life journalists, Jackie
Metcalf and William Ray, were doing an investigative report aimed at
"medical quacks." Working in cooperation with the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's office and county police, Metcalf and Ray
used a ruse to gain entrance to the home of A. A. Dietemann, a dis-
abled veteran and journeyman plumber who was practicing healing
with clay, minerals and herbs.
58. Id. at 703.
59. Id. at 705.
60. Id. Some scholars have expressed alarm over this holding. Professor Fortune
of the University of Kentucky College of Law has said that the effect of this case is
to suggest that journalists, as long as they do not actively participate in the intruding
search for materials, can legally receive the fruits of other's illegal activity. H. NELSON
AND D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 190-91 (2d ed. 1973). See also
Note, 55 IOWA L. REV. 718 (1970).
61. 449 F.2d 245 (9thCir. 1971).
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Metcalf complained to the "doctor" of a lump on her breast. After
an "examination," Dietemann told her the lump was caused by some
rancid butter she had eaten 11 years, 9 months and 7 days ear-
lier. The interaction between Dietemann and Metcalf was secretly
photographed by Ray, who was posing as the "patient's" husband.
Also, the conversation was broadcast via a transmitter concealed in
Metcalf's purse to state investigators waiting in a car near Diete-
mann's property.6 2 When Dietemann was arrested about a month later
at his home on a charge of practicing medicine without a license, Life
photographers were on hand to take more pictures. Two weeks there-
after, the magazine published an article, "Crackdown on Quackery,"
which featured the photographs surreptitiously taken during the exam-
ination. 63
Dietemann sued Time, Inc. (Life), for invasion of privacy, but the
magazine countered that the photos were newsworthy-as they un-
doubtedly were-and hence were protected from any privacy action.
But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals neatly divided the action into
intrusion and publication, and ruled that while the publication might
be protected, the manner in which the information and photos were
obtained was not. The fact that the photos, which had been obtained
improperly, were subsequently published in an article of public in-
terest and importance did not insulate the magazine from an action
based on the manner in which they were obtained. 64 The magazine
had contended that the first amendment protects investigative report-
ing, and that concealed cameras and microphones are indispensable
tools of the investigative reporter. Unimpressed by that argument,
Judge Hufstedler replied: 65
Investigative reporting is an ancient art; its successful practice long
antecedes the invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices.
The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen
immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of news-
gathering.
Dietemann remains sui generis. Since the mass media does not
often engage in surreptitious newsgathering, the intrusion doctrine
62. Id. at 246.
63. Id. at 245-47.
64. Id. at 247-50.
65. Id. at 249.
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should continue to have little effect on its activities. In making edi-
torial decisions, the media need not be concerned with the manner in
which information given to them by an independent third party was
obtained. This is as it should be; otherwise the media would be sad-
dled with the "impossible burden"66 of verifying in each instance the
propriety of any intrusion prior to publication.
IV. PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
A. The Newsworthiness Defense
Ironically, the law of privacy has developed rapidly in all areas
except that of publication of private information-the area of primary
focus in the Warren-Brandeis article. 67 The immense privilege of
"newsworthiness" which courts have erected during the past 70 years
has precluded recovery for the publication of private information ex-
cept in the most outrageous circumstances. 68
Numerous plaintiffs have, with little success, sought damages for
publication of private information in the seven years since Time, Inc.
66. Compare "the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated
in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait"--a burden which the press
need not shoulder under the Constitution. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
The threat that "the legitimate utterance will be penalized" (Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) must be minimized in order that free speech be properly
safeguarded.
67. When Warren and Brandeis wrote "The Right to Privacy" (see note 20 supra),
the kind of conduct they hoped to suppress was that of the snooping, prying news-
paper whose columns were filled with bits of gossip about the private lives of the
citizens of Boston. Whether in fact the newspapers of Boston were operated in this
fashion, or whether this was merely how Samuel Warren perceived the activities of
the press, remains unclear. Warren, the driving force behind the article, was a Brahmin
socialite and perhaps hypersensitive. See D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PREss 33-42
(1972).
Prosser suggested in his pathbreaking article in 1960 (see note 3 supra) that it was
the press coverage of the wedding of one of Warren's daughters which excited Warren
enough to push a reluctant Brandeis into drafting the plea for a right of privacy;
because of Prosser's eminence as a scholar, this story has been republished widely.
The facts, however, do not support the late tort specialist, for the first Warren
daughter to marry, Mabel Bayard Warren, was wed on November 4, 1905, nearly
15 years after the publication of the law review article. PEMBER, supra.
68. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (publica-
tion of article, with plaintiffs picture, about a physical ailment for which she was
being treated in a hospital); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162
So. 2d 474 (1964) (publication, without consent, of a picture showing plaintiff with
her dress blown upward by the wind). See also notes 152 & 153 infra.
Nothing has happened since Time, Inc. v. Hill to alter significantly the nature of
the newsworthiness defense, except in California. That state continues to deviate from
the norm. See text accompanying notes 113-32 infra.
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v. Hill.6 9 The first amendment considerations raised by the Supreme
Court in the 1967 decision have appeared to strengthen the privilege
of newsworthiness. Generally, the privilege will protect a publication
which is in the public interest, which concerns a willing or unwilling
public figure, or which is a report taken exclusively from a public re-
cord. The bulk of decisions rendered in the area of publication of pri-
vate facts since Time, Inc. v. Hill, a few of which are discussed below,
demonstrate a continuing desire to preserve the newsworthiness privi-
lege.
In Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 70 a tangled lawsuit which in-
volved libel more prominently than privacy, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed a judgment granting plaintiffs damage claim
for invasion of privacy. In 1963, the Saturday Evening Post had pub-
lished a story, "They Call Me Tiger Lil," in which entertainer Lillian
Reis Corabi was connected with a murder and accused of master-
minding a complex burglary scheme. So far as Ms. Corabi was con-
cerned, the court held that actual malice could be found on the matter
of libel. 71 However, an invasion of privacy verdict in favor of the
Corabi children could not be sustained merely because they were
identified as the children of a woman to whom the article imputed
guilt or deep involvement in several serious crimes. The court
stated:72
[A] public figure, such as Lillian Reis Corabi, has no exclusive rights
to her own life's story and cannot claim an invasion of privacy if a
biography thereof is published. Another may legitimately publish such
a biography with or without consent and include therein the names of
the members of the subject's family. . . .Hence, the claims of Bar-
bara and Michael Corabi cannot be sustained ....
In Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting,73 the plaintiff and five other
youths were filmed by a television news team as the youths were ar-
rested on suspicion of burglary. The news broadcast that evening in-
cluded scenes of the plaintiff walking with his hands over his head,
being searched with his hands on a police car, and being ushered into
69. See, e.g., Costlow v. Cuismano, 34 App. Div. 2d 196. 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970):
Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
70. 411 Pa. 432. 273 A.2d 899(1971).
71. 273 A.2d at 917.
72. Id. at 918.
73. 472 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
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a police car. Plaintiff, although taken into custody, was later released
after the police admitted a case of mistaken identity. Holding that the
television station was not liable, a Missouri court of appeals insisted
that the plaintiff must show a "serious, unreasonable, unwarranted and
offensive invasion of private affairs" before recovery might be allowed.7 4
The Williams court reasoned:75
In the case at bar, plaintiff was involved in a noteworthy event about
which the public had a right to be informed and which the defendant
[television station] had a right to publicize. This is true even though
his involvement therein was purely involuntary and against his will.
The court conceded that the plaintiff may have been embarrassed, but
refused to find that the infliction of such embarrassment was an ac-
tionable invasion of his privacy.
In Kent v. Pittsburg Press Co.,7 6 the name of a man who was being
released from prison was mentioned in a story about penal reform in
defendant's newspaper. James Henry Kent had won a new trial after
more than a quarter century behind bars and the state chose not to
reprosecute him. There was but a single incidental reference to Kent
in the story; nevertheless, he sued the newspaper for invading his pri-
vacy. The court determined that the penal reform article was clearly
in the public interest and newsworthy, and held that Pittsburgh Press
was not liable.77 Quoting Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media,78 the Kent court stated:79
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to
become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the
public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect
and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety.
Finally, in Costlow v. Cuismano,80 a New York court ruled that a
story about the death of two children who suffocated when they
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
77. Id. at 627.
78. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (a libel case). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
79. 349 F. Supp. at 627.
80. 34 App. Div. 2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970).
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trapped themselves in a refrigerator was of interest to the public and
consequently newsworthy. The plaintiff parents argued that the sensa-
tional style of the article rendered it not newsworthy. But the court, in
its per curiam opinion, rejected this contention, holding that the
manner in which the article was written was not "relevant to whether
the article [was] protected by constitutional guarantees of free
speech." 8t The Costlow court noted82 that in Time, Inc. v. Hill, con-
curring Justice Harlan had proposed that the press be held to stan-
dards of "reasonable care" in newsgathering, and "fair comment" in
reporting; 83 the court then observed that a majority of the Supreme
Court "implicitly rejected his standard, perhaps because it would
force the courts to act as wide-ranging critics of the manner of exposi-
tion used by the press." 84
At least two cases are counter to the trend of preserving the news-
worthiness privilege. In Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance
Co.,8 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the factual iden-
tification of rape victims was an invasion of privacy. This occurred,
however, only because the South Carolina legislature had made an
exception to the privilege of newsworthiness by enacting a statute
prohibiting the publication of names of rape victims. 86
In a more recent case, Smith v. Goro,87 author Herb Goro prepared
a book entitled The Block, in which he attempted to depict the living
conditions on a slum block in the Bronx by use of photographs and
statements from the people who live and work there. Goro was hired
to prepare the book by a foundation with the hope that a graphic de-
scription of the living conditions would generate some social change
in the area. This was indicated to the residents by Goro while pre-
paring the book, and they agreed to cooperate with him. After the
book was published, however, 23 residents of the area sued for inva-
81. 311 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
82. Id.
83. 385 U.S. 374, 409 n.6 (1967).
84. 311 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
85. 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963). Compare Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.
231 Ga. 60. 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973). appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 15.
1974). wherein the father of a deceased rape victim brought an invasion of privacy
cause of action based upon a Georgia nonpublication statute. GA. CODE ANN.
§26-9901 (1972).
86. S.C. CoD ANN § 16 81 (1962).
87. 66 Misc. 2d 1011. 323 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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sion of privacy on grounds that the use of their pictures and names
was unauthorized, and that the statements attributed to them in the
book were either fictional or had been obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation.
The Goro court denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to stop
the sale of the book. However, the court also denied Goro's motion to
dismiss, in which he alleged that the book represented a clearly news-
worthy subject, i.e., the plight of those living in the ghetto. While
admitting that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press
protects factual reporting of newsworthy persons and events, the court
stated that a similar protection may not exist for reports of private
individuals where "there was nothing particular about the lives of
these plaintiffs that separated them from their fellows as peculiar sub-
jects of public interest so as to preclude their right of privacy. '88 The
court added that "no case has been cited or found which supports the
view that a writer may seek out such people and write about them and
by that fact alone make them . . .persons of public interest. 89
B. The Involuntary Public Figure Doctrine
Although the Goro court was quite correct in suggesting that one
cannot actively seek out an otherwise private person and make him a
public figure, nonetheless, after Time, Inc. v. Hill, one is generally
free to publicize events-and the people engaged in those events-
where the occurrences themselves thrust the otherwise private person
into the public arena. Many jurisdictions, including New York, have
adopted this legal concept of the "involuntary public figure." 90 The
Kentucky Supreme Court first enunciated the concept in 1929:91
There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not,
becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest.
When this takes place he emerges from his seclusion, and it is not
an invasion of his right of privacy to publish his photograph with
an account of such occurrence.
88. 323 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
89. Id. at 51-52. For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes
102-12 infra.
90. See, e.g., 323 N.Y.S.2d at 50-51, and cases cited therein.
91. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929).
Washington Law Review
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,92 the United States Suprem
Court adopted a similar rule for libel cases. Prior to that 1971 deci
sion the Court had determined that the first amendment malice rul
applied only to plaintiffs who were public officials :3 3 or public fig
ures:14-persons who had on their own initiative thrust themselves int,
the vortex of public affairs. The Rosenbloom Court also attempte
to define the legal consequences of the "creation" of a public figurl
from a private citizen through publicity-what some people cal
bootstrapping-that is, by pulling a private individual into the publi,
spotlight with defamatory publicity. In an eminently logical decision
a plurality of the Rosenbloom Court suggested that the individual',
prior fame or anonymity was not the important issue. Rather, the ke,
issue was the public interest in the occurrence or event. :5 Privat,
people who became involved, willingly or unwillingly, in events o
public or general concern would henceforth be required to prove ac
tual malice in order to recover damages in defamation suits.
The Rosenbloom Court's adoption of the involuntary public figure
rule, however, was effectively if not expressly overturned in Gert;
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 6 Petitioner Elmer Gertz, a well-known anc
highly visible civil rights attorney and author, brought a libel actior
against respondent publisher for describing him variously as a "com
munist-fronter," "Leninist," "Marxist" and "Red." In reversing ajudg
ment for respondent,97 Justice Powell, writing for a majority oi
the Court, held that to maintain a libel action private persons who dc
not seek punitive damages need only prove negligence-not actual mal-
ice-on the part of the publisher. 8  Gertz thus substantiall)
restricts the availability of the first amendment defense to publishen
in libel actions.
The validity of Gertz may be questioned, however. The Gert
Court's classification of petitioner as a "private person" cannot be jus-
92. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Court in Rosenbloom affirmed the court of appeals'
reversal of a $250.000 judgment for petitioner-pornography dealer, levied againsl
respondent-broadcaster who identified petitioner as a "smut merchant" and "girlie-book
peddler."
93. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
94. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130 1967).
95. 403 U.S. at 44.
96. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
97. Plaintiff Gertz obtained a jury verdict in his favor, but the trial court
rendered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 3002.
98. ld.at 3010-11.
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tified. Gertz was a member of numerous boards and commissions in
Illinois, had published several books on civil rights matters, had fre-
quently been honored by civil rights groups and had represented some
rather famous clients, including Nathan Leopold and the publishers of
Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer. His publishing record belies the no-
tion that he was a poor, helpless, private individual who could not
gain access to the press. Gertz was a public figure in every sense of the
term as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Butts.9 9 The Ro-
senbloom rule should not have been at issue in the case.
At this juncture, it is difficult to assess the impact of Gertz upon
privacy law. However, at least two observations suggest that its impact
will be negligible. 100 First, Time, Inc. v. Hill dealt with nondefama-
tory publication, whereas Gertz dealt with that which was defamatory.
Only nondefamatory publication is at issue in an unadulterated pri-
vacy action, since the presence of defamation invokes libel principles.
Second, the involuntary public figure rule in privacy law is
grounded in some fifty years of precedent, up to and including Time,
Inc. v. Hill.10 ' It is not to be assumed that Gertz would overturn such
well-established doctrine without squarely confronting it. It appears,
then, that the vitality of Time, Inc. v. Hill persists with respect to pri-
vacy actions untainted by libel claims, despite the holding in Gertz.
Assuming the continued vitality of the involuntary public figure
doctrine, one troubling question remains: How do courts decide who
is or is not a "public figure?" The question can be placed in proper
perspective by analyzing the decision in Smith v. Goro.10 2 That case,
previously discussed,10 3 involved the publication of interviews con-
99. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). "Public figures" are persons "whose views and actions
with respect to public issues and events are often of as much concern to the citizen
as the attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with respect to the same issues and
events." Id. at 162.
100. The overruling of the "involuntary public figure" concept in Gertz was
justified by two primary considerations: the relative inaccessibility of the mass media
to an otherwise private individual seeking to rebut defamatory statements, and the
strong state interest in protecting the reputation of the individual. 94 S. Ct. at 3009-10.
These are, interestingly, precisely the considerations found inapposite in Time, Inc.
v. Hill because the statements therein were nondefamatory. 385 U.S. at 390-91.
The Gertz majority quoted that portion of Time, Inc. v. Hill which found inapposite
the above considerations. 94 S. Ct. at 3005 n.6. In so doing, it implicitly recognized
the impropriety of too easily analogizing between the law of libel and that of privacy.
101. See Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).
102. 66 Misc. 2d 1011, 323 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1970).
103. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
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ducted with New York City slum dwellers. Ruling on defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss, 10 4 the court found an invasion of the slum dwel-
lers' privacy because there was no occurrence or extraordinary event
which thrust those people into the public spotlight; in short, the
publication was not ,newsworthy" because the people were not "pub-
lic figures."' 0 5
The newsworthiness defense, however, is triggered by the presence
of public interest alone. To be sure, it is often a particular occurrence
which triggers the public interest; but that need not always be so. The
lives of persons who are poor, ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed-as
well as those who, by contrast, live in opulence-are traditionally
"newsworthy;" society is, for whatever reasons, interested in such
conditions. Courts have conceded that an almost endless variety of
topics have public interest: stories and pictures about suicide, 06 di-
vorce, 10 7 criminal activity, 08 preteenage motherhood' 09 and women
exercising" 0 are just a few of the vast number of subjects placed
within the legitimate ambit of the American public interest.
The inherent difficulty in predicting what is or is not "news-
worthy"-and therefore protected-publication suggests that the
best way to prevent legitimate dissemination of private information
is simply to refuse to speak to representatives of the mass media.
But the person who grants an interview to a newsperson has little
cause to complain when the information provided is subsequently
published. The real problem in many privacy actions, such as that
in Goro, is not that private information has been published, but
that the plaintiff does not like the way the story was written,
or thinks the information placed the plaintiff in an unfavorable
light. The privacy action is actually a disguised libel action,
which would not pass muster if cast as the latter.
The standard public interest-or "newsworthiness"-test,
which has been used in the vast majority of privacy adjudications
104. In considering the motion to dismiss, the court accepted plaintiff's pleaded
facts as true.
105. 323 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
106. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304. 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
107. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948).
108. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817. 76 N.W.2d 762
(1956).
109. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330. 95 S.E.2d 606(1956).
110. Sweenek v. Pathe News. Inc.. 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
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in the past 65 years, is a highly functional one. First,, it pro-
vides a wide range of freedom of expression, which has always been
valued in our democratic society. Second, it is easy to administer.
The judge does not have to wear the cloak of social censor, evalu-
ating (and thereby structuring) the reading interests and beha-
vioral habits of the population.111
Use of the public interest test does not vitiate the right of privacy.
Everything that is done in private in the home, office, car or other
similarly private place should remain private. In order for the press to
obtain information about such private activities, an intrusion which
would constitute an invasion of privacy must be made. On the other
hand, affairs conducted in public, such as shopping trips, dinner at a
restaurant, attendance at a concert or a class are hardly private
events. They are conducted in public. They may be personal but they
are not private.112
111. The effect of the "social policy" test applied in California is just the opposite.
See text accompanying note 126 infra.
112. The recent and famous case of Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1973), is illustrative of this point. Galella, a free-lance photographer who describes
himself as a "paparazzo" (a pest more annoying than a gadfly), has for some time
produced a substantial income by taking and selling photographs of Jacqueline Onassis
and her children. The secret service agents guarding the ex-first family finally became
so exasperated with Galella's obtrusive behavior that they caused his arrest and
detention. Following acquittal from criminal charges, Galella sued Onassis and the
agents for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and interference with trade. Defendant
Onassis counterclaimed for injunctive relief from Galella's offensive tactics. The
complaint against the agents was dismissed (id. at 991 n.1), as was the com-
plaint against Onassis. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). Granting defendant
Onassis' counterclaim for injunctive relief, the trial court found Galella guilty of
"harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, com-
mercial exploitation of defendant's personality, and invasion of privacy." 487 F.2d
at 994. Evidence showed that Galella had
intentionally physically touched Mrs. Onassis and her daughter, caused fear of
physical contact in his frenzied attempts to get their pictures, followed defendant
and her children too closely in an automobile, [and] endangered the safety of the
children while they were swimming, water skiing and horseback riding. ..
Id. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but modified the
terms of the injunction. Id. at 998-99. The court noted that Mrs. Onassis was
properly found to be a "public figure"; yet it went on to state:
Nonetheless, Galella's action went far beyond the reasonable bounds of news
gathering. When weighed against the de minimus public importance of the daily
activities of the defendant, Galella's constant surveillance, his obtrusive and
intruding presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable. ...
Id. at 995. This language suggests a "social value" balancing approach such as that
used in California (see text accompanying notes 113-33 infra); yet one suspects
that the grant of injunctive relief was most probably based on the likelihood of
future assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the like,
rather than upon invasion of privacy. This position is substantiated by the court's
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If, in the Goro case, the plaintiffs did in fact refuse to cooperate
with Goro and he obtained the information surreptitiously, then per-
haps there was an intrusion and an action could have been maintained
on that basis. Or if the book placed the plaintiffs in a false light, this
could have been the basis for the action. Either of these approaches is
more reasonable than attempting to argue that a story about the lives
of ghetto residents is without public interest.
C. California's Social Value Test
The California courts stand alone in employing a "social value" test
to analyze publications involved in privacy suits. The social value test
originated in 1931 with the famous, although overrated, case of
Melvin v. Reid.' 13 The lawsuit involved a prostitute, Gabrielle Darley,
who had been tried for, and acquitted of, murder charges in 1918.
After her acquittal she reformed her life, married a man named
Melvin and began living an "exemplary, virtuous, honorable, and
righteous life.""14 Several years after her trial, a motion picture com-
pany released a film, "The Red Kimono," which was advertised as
being based on the true story of plaintiffs life as a prostitute and ac-
cused murderess. Ms. Melvin's maiden name was used throughout the
film.
In the privacy action which followed-the first such action in the
state-a California court of appeals ruled that the publicity was ac-
tionable, but the court's opinion was most curious. The California
court rejected the argument that a right of privacy was inherent in
California common law.' 15 Instead, the court grounded the ac-
tion in a state constitutional provision which guaranteed to citizens
the right to pursue and obtain safety and happiness. Writing for the
Melvin court, Judge Marks held that although the events of Ms. Mel-
vin's past life were clearly in the public record and hence newsworthy,
later holding that -[a] ny further restriction on Galella's taking and selling pictures
of defendant for news coverage is, however, improper and unwarranted by the
evidence." Id. at 998. Thus, it appears that Galella would be free to continue his
newsgathering. so long as he does not commit or attempt to commit tortious or
criminal acts in the process.
113. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (193 1).
114. 297P. at91.
115. Id. at 93.
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the use of her maiden name in connection with those events was pro-
tected.116
Two factors seemed to tip the scales in favor of the plaintiff. First,
the film was purely a commercial venture, a profit-making exercise. 117
Second, given plaintiff's successful self-rehabilitation from a shame-
ful life, the court could find little social utility in a film which resulted
in negating much of the plaintiffs efforts to regain a respected posi-
tion in society. 118
The social value test was utilized by the California Supreme Court
in Kapellas v. Kofman. 1 9 The Kapellas action was based on an edi-
torial in the Alameda Times-Star which questioned the suitability of
Inez Kapellas' candidacy for public office. The editor noted that Ms.
Kapellas had several children and that the children had been in scrapes
with the law in the past. The editorial asked if it might not be better
if Ms. Kapellas spent her time raising her family instead of running
for office. After considering the editorial's social value, the California
court determined that it was newsworthy and rejected the invasion of
privacy claims of Ms. Kapellas and her children.' 20
The social value test was next applied in Briscoe v. Reader's Di-
gest Association,121 decided by the California Supreme Court in
1971. Fifteen years earlier, Marvin Briscoe and a friend hijacked a
truck which they thought contained valuable cargo, but which actually
contained only four bowling-pin spotters, items which the hijackers
could hardly resell. After a gun battle with local police, Briscoe
was captured, tried and sent to prison. In 1967, Bill Surface wrote
a story, "The Big Business of Hijacking," for Chicago's American
magazine. Reprinted in the Reader's Digest in 1968, the story in-
cluded a reference to Briscoe's bowling-pin-spotter misadventure and
mentioned his gunfight with police before being captured. However,
the article did not note that the event had taken place 11 years earlier.
In Briscoe's complaint, he stated that since his release from jail, he
had led an exemplary life and had rehabilitated himself socially, and
116. Id.
117. This finding alone would be sufficient to dispose of the case in plaintiff's
favor under the doctrine of commercial appropriation. See note 170 infra.
118. 297 P.2d at 93.
119. 1 Cal. 3d 20,459 P.2d 912. 81 Cal. Rptr. 360(1969).
120. 459 P.2d at 922-24, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370-72.
121. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
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that the adverse publicity had damaged him. He contended that as a
result of the article's appearance in Reader's Digest, his 1 1-year-old
daughter-as well as his friends-heard of his past for the first time,
and thereafter "scorned and abandoned him."' 122 Relying upon Mel-
vin, Briscoe contended that while incidents from his past life were
newsworthy, the use of his name was not. Reader's Digest's demurrer
was sustained by the trial court, apparently on the basis that the mate-
rial Briscoe found objectionable was newsworthy. 123 But the Supreme
Court of California, citing Melvin, reversed the lower courts and held
that Briscoe had stated a cause of action sufficient to require a trial on
the merits. The court reasoned: 124
Plaintiff is a man whose last offense took place I1 years before,
who has paid his debt to society, who has friends and an I l-year-old
daughter who were unaware of his early life-a man who has assumed
a position in "respectable" society. Ideally, his neighbors should rec-
ognize his present worth and forget his past life of shame. But men are
not so divine as to forgive the past trespasses of others, and plaintiff
therefore endeavored to reveal as little as possible of his past life. Yet,
as if in some bizarre canyon of echoes, petitioner's past life pursues
him through the pages of Reader's Digest, now published in 13 lan-
guages and distributed in 100 nations, with a circulation in California
alone of almost 2,000,000 copies.
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always
difficult to declare that something may not be published. But the great
general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by
other great societal interests. As a people we have come to recognize
that one of these societal interests is that of protecting an individual's
right to privacy. The right to know and the right to have others not
know are, simplistically considered, irreconcilable. But the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of
the right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a
minimum of intrusion upon the other.
The court in Briscoe obviously gave more weight to the interest of
the state and the plaintiff in his rehabilitation and anonymity than to
the public interest in reading an unbowdlerized account of a public
trial which occurred more than a decade earlier. In remanding the
122. 483 P.2d at 36. 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
123. Id.
124. 483 P.2d at 41 42. 93 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74 (footnotes omitted).
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case for trial, the supreme court directed the lower court to determine
whether or not Briscoe had become a rehabilitated member of society,
to consider whether identification of Briscoe as a former criminal
would be highly injurious and offensive to a reasonable man and to
consider whether the use of Briscoe's name was justified. 125
By adopting the social value approach to adjudication of privacy
actions, the California judiciary assumes a censorship role, deciding
what the public should read, see or hear in light of the likelihood of
damage to the reputation of an individual by publication. 126 Other
jurisdictions, fearful of falling into the trap of "social engineering,"
have wisely declined to adopt such a policy. For example, in Barbieri
v. News Journal Co., the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed plain-
tiff's reliance on Melvin as follows: 127
With deference to the California Court of Appeal, we must express
a serious doubt whether [the] basis of the decision-the unnecessary
and indelicate use of plaintiffs name-is a sound one on which to sus-
tain an action for invasion of privacy. Such a rule would in reality sub-
ject the public press to a standard of good taste-a standard too elu-
sive to serve as a workable rule of law....
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sidis v. F-R Pub-
lishing Co. 128 similarly resisted the temptation to pass judgment on
the value or utility of a publication. William James Sidis, in 1910, had
been an 1 1-year-old prodigy who lectured to eminent mathematicians.
Graduated from Harvard University at 16, Sidis received considerable
125. 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
Despite the sweep of the supreme court opinion, Briscoe did not win his case on
remand. Attorneys for Reader's Digest removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, where the judge granted, without
opinion, a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the magazine. H. NELSON
& D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICArIONS 199 (2d ed. 1973).
126. It is noteworthy that throughout the history of the law of privacy, most
judges have deftly evaded the twin-horned dilemma of attempting to define public
taste or to evaluate the social utility of a publication. Those are uncomfortable,
dangerously sharp horns at best. Suppose that a candidate for public office in Cali-
fornia has in his or her past an unsavory event-a prison term perhaps--but rehabili-
tation has occurred. Is the publication of such information an invasion of privacy?
Or is there an overriding public interest in revealing the candidate's background? Or
would it depend on the magnitude of the "stain" and the importance of the office?
If such a person is in high office in private industry, rather than in public office,
should that individual receive more protection than a public servant? A business
executive makes decisions which, like those of public officials, can affect the lives of
many citizens.
127. 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773,776(1963).
128. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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publicity. More than 20 years after his graduation, New Yorker mag-
azine published a "Where Are They Now?" article about Sidis and
other child prodigies. Sidis, however, wanted only to be left alone. He
had become reclusive, lived in an ill-appointed room on the south side
of Boston, and worked in obscurity as a clerk.' 29 Despite the plain-
tiff's desire to be left alone, Judge Clark, writing for the court, found
for New Yorker magazine: 130
Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and
"public figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to
the rest of the population. And when such are the mores of the com-
munity, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the
newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.
Federal courts in California already seem a bit uncomfortable with
the social value approach. For example, in Goldman v. Time, Inc.,' 31
involving a Life magazine story about two young Californians who
were living in a cave on the island of Crete, the court found the social
value test to be merely one aspect of newsworthiness. The court cre-
atcd a considerable presumption for the defendant:' 32
[T] he right of the public to know, and of the media to tell, is so deeply
entrenched in the American conscience that a great deal of latitude
must necessarily be afforded the media in its selection and presenta-
tion of news.
In Goldman the court measured the newsworthiness of the article by
determining the degree of public interest in the activities of disen-
chanted, young American expatriates, rather than by attempting to
determine the social value of the published report. Whether the social
value approach is ever adopted beyond California's borders, or
whether the state's new privacy statute' 33 will nullify the home-grown
common law rule, remains to be seen.
129. Id. at 807. One legal scholar has contended that this nondefamatory publicity,
which Sidis wished desperately to avoid, most certainly hastened Sidis" early death.
Prosser, supra note 3, at 397.
130. 113 F.2d at 809.
131. 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
132. Id. at 138.
133. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1974) provides as follows:
§ 3344. Use of another's name, photograph, or likeness for advertising or
solicitation purposes
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph. or likeness.
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V. NONDEFAMATORY FALSEHOODS
The greatest impact of Time, Inc. v. Hill has been in the area of
privacy law which may be termed "publication of nondefamatory
in any manner, for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or
services, or for purposes of solicitation of purchases of products, merchandise,
goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor,
the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall b6 liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any
action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall be
liable to the injured party or parties in an amount no less than three hundred
dollars ($300).
(b) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photo-
graphic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television trans-
mission, of any person, such that the person is readily identifiable.
(1) A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph
when one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably deter-
mine that the person depicted in the photograph is the same person who is
complaining of its unauthorized use.
(2) If the photograph includes more than one person so identifiable, then the
person or persons complaining of the use shall be represented as individuals
rather than solely as members of a definable group represented in the photograph.
A definable group includes, but is not limited to, the following examples: a crowd
at any sporting event, a crowd in any street or public building, the audience at
any theatrical or stage production, a glee club, or a baseball team.
(3) A person or persons shall be considered to be represented as members of
a definable group if they are represented in the photograph solely as a result of
being present at the time the photograph was taken and have not been singled
out as individuals in any manner.
(c) Where a photograph or likeness of an employee of the person using the
photograph or likeness appearing in the advertisement or other publication
prepared by or in behalf of the user is only incidental, and not essential, to the
purpose of the publication in which it appears, there shall arise a rebuttable
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that the failure to obtain
the consent of the employee was not a knowing use of the employee's photo-
graph or likeness.
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, photograph or likeness in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or
solicitation.
(e) The use of a name, photograph or likeness in a commercial medium shall not
constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation solely because the
material containing such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid adver-
tising. Rather it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the com-
plainant's name, photograph or likeness was so directly connected with the
commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for
purposes of advertising or solicitation.
(f) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees of any
medium used for advertising, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines,
radio and television stations, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any advertise-
ment or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated,
unless it is established that such owners or employees had knowledge of the
unauthorized use of the person's name, photograph, or likeness as prohibited
by this section.
(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in
addition to any others provided for by law.
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falsehoods."'' 34 Time, Inc. v. Hill, as described earlier in this arti-
cle,' 35 involved publication of untruthful but nondefamatory state-
ments about the James J. Hill family. Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion, while somewhat inexplicit, applied an existing definition of
"actual malice" (borrowed from libel law) to the tort of invasion of
privacy.' 36 In essence, Brennan's opinion was that in privacy actions
involving untruthful publications on subjects of public interest, plain-
tiffs must henceforth prove that defendants' untruthful statements
were made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.' 37
Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co.' 38 was one of the first lower court
rulings to apply the new first amendment rule announced in Time Inc.
v. Hill. Holmes involved the often-sued and now-defunct magazine,
the Saturday Evening Post. James Holmes complained that the Post
had published an unauthorized photograph of him, taken by a Post
photographer, while Holmes gambled at the Monte Carlo Club on
Grand Bahama Island, Bahamas. The picture was captioned
"High-Rollers at Monte Carlo have dropped as much as $20,000 in a
single night," and was used to illustrate a story claiming Mafia influ-
ence in the Bahamas. The caption added, "The U.S. Department of
Justice estimates that the Casino grosses $20 million a year, and that
one-third is skimmed off for American Mafia 'families.' "39 Holmes
claimed that the caption put him in a false light.
The Holmes court characterized Mr. Holmes as an innocent tourist
who unwittingly became the subject of a photograph whose caption
may have given rise to false inferences about his character. After la-
menting the rather unsettled state of privacy law following "the recent
Supreme Court decisions in the field,"'140 the court decided that
Holmes would have to satisfy the New York Times malice rule and
prove that the picture and caption were published with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.' 4' Subsequent to
134. Prosser, supra note 3, at 398-401 (1960). Dean Prosser termed this category
"'false light" but there really is much more involved than merely placing an individual
in a false light.
135. See text accompanying notes 28-45 supra.
136. 385 U.S. 374, 386-88.
137. Id.
138. 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969).
139. Id. at 523.
140. Id. at 524.
141. Id. at527.
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the ruling, plaintiff Holmes voluntarily abandoned his action. 142
In Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co.,143 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court added another dimension to the burden of proof to be borne by
a plaintiff. Once again, the Saturday Evening Post sat in the defend-
ant's seat-this time for the publication of an article entitled "They
Call Me Tiger Lil," a story noted earlier in this article about an enter-
tainer who allegedly masterminded a burglary. 144 Lillian Corabi sued
in Pennsylvania for both libel and invasion of privacy. The magazine
argued that under New York Times and Time, Inc. v. Hill, the burden
was on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the material as well as
malice. The court rejected defendant's argument, holding that the de-
fendant still must prove truth; if it cannot, the burden falls on the
plaintiff to prove only malice, not falsity as well.' 45
But as discovered in libel cases, proving malice alone is no light
burden for a plaintiff. In Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 46 the court
ruled that malice was not shown merely by demonstrating that the
truth might have been discovered if the reporter had conducted a
more thorough investigation. As noted earlier,1 47 Kent involved
67-year-old James Henry Kent who had been released from prison
after 27 years of incarceration. Kent had won a new trial and the state
had chosen not to reprosecute him. In the course of describing certain
prisoners and their crimes, reporter Jack Grochot had written of
Kent:148
Standing [in the reception room] was 67-year-old James Henry Kent,
dressed in a gray gabardine suit and waiting patiently for his final re-
lease papers-he was getting out after 27 years. He too had taken a
life.
In response to plaintiff Kent's argument that if the reporter had inves-
tigated the matter more fully, he would have discovered the facts, the
court stated:149
142. The plaintiff agreed to a nominal settlement prior to trial. Telephone
interview with attorney for defendant, A. T. Smythe, Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee,
Charleston, S.C., Oct. 25, 1974.
143. 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
144. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
145. 273 A.2d at 917.
146. 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
147. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
148. 349 F. Supp. at 623.
149. Id. at 626. The court cited St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968),
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Obviously if Grochot had checked the court records relating to Kent,
he could have discovered the reason for his release. Obviously too.
however, he had no reason in the circumstances to entertain any
doubts, quite apart from serious doubts, as to the matter of Kent's re-
lease.
Thus, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden but, as Varnish v. Best
Medium Publishing Co.1 50 demonstrates, not one that makes a suc-
cessful action impossible. Varnish involved the publication, in the
National Enquirer newspaper, of an article describing the suicide of a
young mother who had taken her own life after killing her three chil-
dren. In the story, the mother was pictured as stable and happy, one
who had no apparent reason for suicide. The Varnish court applied
the New York Times malice rule, reasoning that while the scope of
public interest had yet to be clearly defined, a murder-suicide was
clearly within that scope. Yet, even using the New York Times rule,
the court found for plaintiff holding that he had met the requisite
burden of proof by showing that evidence, ignored by the defendant,
demonstrated that Ms. Varnish had been despondent and depressed.
Mr. Varnish also showed that the National Enquirer had published
only a portion of the suicide note, and that the entire note explained
the dead woman's motives more fully. The reporter on the story ad-
mitted at trial that he had access to all the true facts in the case and
that his depiction of Ms. Varnish as the "happy mother" was merely
his own presumption. The court ruled that minor inaccuracies and even
fictional dialogue would not alone defeat the privilege granted to
newsworthy reports, but that based on the record of this case a jury
could find the substantial falsity required to defeat the newsworthi-
ness privilege. Judge Lumbard added that the use of only a part of
the suicide note, when the reporter possessed the entire note, could
well be sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of reckless dis-
regard for the truth.1 5 1
Among reported cases since Time, Inc. v. Hill, the decision in Var-
nish stands virtually alone. Yet it suggests that, as in the law of libel,
in discussing the issue of whether or not the reporter had a "reckless disregard for
truth." In St. Amant, a libel action, a political candidate relied upon an individual's
unverified affidavit to expose certain financial transactions of questionable propriety
allegedly conducted by his political opponent. Although the allegations proved to be
false, the Court declined to find a showing of reckless disregard. Id. at 730-3 1.
150. 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
151. Id. at 612.
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privacy law seems able to handle what one might term the atrocious
case. In libel, the law would not tolerate Ralph Ginzburg's fantasies
about Barry Goldwater and awarded the Arizona Senator damages. 152
Similarly in privacy, the sensational and fictional account of a
murder-suicide fell outside the bounds of first amendment protec-
tion. 153
VI. APPROPRIATION
If there is certainty in any area of privacy law, it is in the area of
appropriation. Use of an individual's name or likeness for commercial
gain, without consent, is an invasion of privacy.'5 4 In the years since
Time, Inc. v. Hill, a refreshing frankness has crept into the case law in
this area. More and more courts seem willing to acknowledge that
plaintiffs who sue for appropriation deserve damages not because they
suffered some kind of severe mental distress but because the defendant
used something which belonged to the plaintiff-his name or likeness
-without compensation.
In early appropriation cases, the courts identified the right of pri-
vacy as only a personal right, failing to recognize that the plaintiff was
in fact compensated for appropriation of a property right.' 55 This
oversight was substantially corrected in 1953 when Judge Frank of
the Second Circuit suggested that in most appropriation cases, at issue
is not a right of privacy, but rather a "right of publicity"-that is, the
right to control the commercial exploitation of oneself. 56 Despite the
lucid insight of Judge Frank, and despite some eloquent scholarly
152. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1049 (1970). Senator Barry Goldwater was awarded $1 compensatory and
$75,000 punitive damages in this libel action based upon magazine articles published
immediately prior to the 1964 presidential election.
153. Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968).
154. This is the oldest of the four areas of privacy law. Early cases in the area
of appropriation are collected in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902); in the year following that decision, New York's privacy
statute-the first legislative recognition of a legal right to privacy-was enacted to
provide relief in appropriation cases. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
155. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S.E. 68 (1905). In that case the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the use of
plaintiffs picture and name in a testimonial advertisement constituted an invasion of
his privacy. Putting the plaintiff on public display was humiliating, the court sug-
gested; however the court failed to consider plaintiffs claim that he had been deprived
of a property right for which he should have been compensated.
156. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953).
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pleas in law reviews for recognition of the "right of publicity,"' 5 7 the
myth that appropriation involves a right of privacy dominated privacy
law for nearly twenty more years.
During the last few years, however, many courts have concluded
that Judge Frank's concept is correct. In two cases involving profes-
sional athletes, Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc.,' 58 and Uhl-
aender v. Henricksen,15 9 a New Jersey state court and a federal dis-
trict court in Minnesota respectively ruled that well-known athletes
have a property right in their identities. In the first case, golfers Ar-
nold Palmer, Gary Player, Doug Sanders and Jack Nicklaus sued a
game manufacturer who had used their names without their consent.
Judge Horn of the New Jersey Superior Court wrote in Palmer: -'Per-
haps the basic and underlying theory is that a person has the right to
enjoy the fruits of his own industry free from unjustified interference. "'
In the second case, Ted Uhlaender represented several hundred major
league baseball players in an action against another game manufac-
turer. The Uhlaender court held that, "a celebrity has a legitimate
proprietary interest in his public personality."' 61 The court added that
the celebrity's "identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and
other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of
property."1 62
In Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 163 a New Jersey court held that
even a private individual-in this instance a homeowner who found
his family's names and pictures on advertisements for the real estate
company that sold him a house-enjoys a property right in his
identity. The court found that "however little or much plaintiffs like-
ness and name may be worth, defendant, who has appropriated them
for his commercial benefit, should be made to pay for what he has
taken... ."164
Two courts in New York have purportedly rejected this property
right concept in recent appropriation cases. In Paulsen v. Personality
157. See, e.g., Nimmer. The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203
(1954); Gordon. Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960).
158. 96 N.J. Super. 72. 232 A.2d 458 (1967).
159. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
160. 232 A.2d at 462 (citations omitted).
161. 316 F. Supp. at 1282.
162. Id.
163. 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967).
164. 235 A.2d at 65.
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Posters, Inc.,165 the court rejected the concept, yet gave a semblance
of credibility to the emerging right of publicity by isolating it from the
traditional right of privacy. The lugubrious-faced comedian Pat Paul-
sen, in the midst of his sportive 1968 campaign for the Presidency,
sued a poster company which had printed and sold a large picture of
Paulsen with the words "For President" across the bottom. There was
a good deal of conflicting evidence about how the publisher obtained
the picture in the first place, and the court refused to hold the de-
fendant liable. Citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Paulsen court noted that
there were serious first amendment questions involved in the case:
"When a well-known entertainer enters the presidential ring, tongue in
cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public interest... "166
The court recognized that what Paulsen sought was not protection for
his privacy. That was the last thing Paulsen wanted: "What such a
figure really seeks is a type of relief which will enable him to garner
financial benefits from the pecuniary value which attaches to his name
and picture."'167 The court acknowledged that this was called the right
of publicity, a right which had been accorded some limited judicial
recognition. But, it added, "the courts of this state have evidenced no
inclination to adopt or follow such construction within the context of
Section 51 [of the New York privacy statute] ."168
Man v. Warner Bros.,169 like Paulsen, involved the deliberate pub-
lication of an entertainer's picture without his consent. In 1969 pro-
fessional musician Frank Man stepped on stage during the four-day
Woodstock Music Festival in Bethel, New York, and played "mess
call" on his fliigelhorn. Producers of the film "Woodstock" included
Man's 45-second appearance in their film, and the musician sued on
the ground that his likeness had been appropriated for a commercial
film without his consent and without payment. The court rejected
Man's claim, reasoning that the defendants' profit motive and com-
mercial exploitation of the fim "does not negate their right to depict a
165. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
166. 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
167. Id. at 508.
168. Id.
169. 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
170. Id. at 52. But see Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Hawaii
374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. N.Y.
1971) (plaintiffs successful where name or likeness used in advertisement or for
purely commercial purposes). In cases in which a clear commercial interest devoid
of any public interest is not shown, plaintiffs are less often successful. See, e.g.,
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matter of public interest .... 170 The court then stated: 171
[T] here was no invasion of any "right of privacy." Plaintiff, a profes-
sional entertainer, gave his show before a vast audience . . . .His
grievance here is not the invasion of his "privacy"-privacy is the one
thing he did not want, or need, in his occupation. His real complaint,
and perhaps a justified one, but one we cannot redress in this suit
brought under the New York "Right of Privacy" statutes, is that he
was not paid ....
The right of publicity doubtless will continue to grow. But whether
it will grow as a separate right, as suggested by Judge Frank, or dis-
place the appropriation area of privacy law remains to be seen. Al-
though now, even in the area of appropriation, first amendment lan-
guage is creeping into opinions where it would not have been found
prior to Time, Inc. v. Hill,172 there is no measurably greater protec-
tion of the press today than there was at the turn of the century.
VII. CONCLUSION
The lack of cataclysmic change in privacy law since Time, Inc. v.
Hill can be explained by the fact that the first amendment rule directly
impacts only one of the four areas of the invasion of privacy tort: pub-
lication of private information. Also, the "new" first amendment de-
fense is in many ways closely akin to the defense of newsworthiness,
which has long existed in the law of privacy. The law of libel, by
comparison, went through far more revolutionary changes following
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, primarily because the rule struck
directly at the vast majority of libel actions.
Roughly 75 years after Warren and Brandeis wrote their article,
one may regret that those worthy gentlemen ever set pen to paper. It
may now be desirable, as some have suggested, 173 to merge the law of
Rand v. Hearst Corp.. 31 App. Div. 2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1969); Pagan v.
New York Herald Tribune. Inc.. 32 App. Div. 2d 341. 301 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1969):
Murray v. New York Magazine Co.. 27 N.Y.2d 406. 267 N.E.2d 256. 318 N.Y.S.2d
474(1971).
171. 317 F. Supp. at 53. quoting Chief Judge Desmond concurring in Gautier v.
Pro-Football, Inc.. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952).
172. See, e.g., Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 406. 298 N.Y.S.2d 405
(1969): Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); Leopold v. Levin, 45 II. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
173. Prosser, supra note 3. at 401.
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privacy and libel into a single tort. For example, the nondefamatory
falsehood area of privacy law might be merged with the law of libel.
The intrusion element of privacy law could be melded into trespass,
and the appropriation area could be mixed with the law of literary
property or contracts. Publication of private information could be-
come an element, perhaps, of the even newer tort of intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress. 174 Such reworking of the law would, of course,
eliminate much of the "law of privacy" in all jurisdictions except those
few with privacy statutes. This would be desirable as a means of or-
dering the haphazardly created congeries of rulings we refer to as the
law of privacy.
A merger of the law of privacy and libel, however, seems more un-
likely as time passes and as each of the four areas of privacy law is
defined with increasing particularity by its "own" case law. The pri-
vacy of individuals-variously defined from jurisdiction to juris-
diction-will continue to be protected in four-fifths of the states.
Yet, with both the first amendment defense as construed by the Court
in Time, Inc. v. Hill, and the traditional defense of newsworthiness,
journalistic freedom should be well protected in actions based on pri-
vate information or nondefamatory falsehoods. Only the most outra-
geous circumstances will enable a plaintiff to penetrate the media's
defenses. Thus, using a name or picture for commercial gain will con-
tinue to be actionable in nearly all cases. If reporters maintain tradi-
tional means of investigative reporting and eschew hidden cameras,
microphones, bugs and similar surreptitious devices, the mass media
can avoid exposure to actions claiming unlawful intrusion. Perhaps
the only additional protection necessary to preserve the health and
vitality of journalistic freedom of expression is to quarantine the un-
workable, aberrant social policy approach within California's borders
and thus prevent infection of the remainder of the nation.
174. Id.
